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INTRODUCTION
In New York City, owners violated zoning regulations and opened
up their basements, garages, and other floors to rent to people
(particularly low-income immigrants) priced out of the formal
1
market. The more than 100,000 illegal dwelling units in New York
City (NYC) were referred to as “granny units,” “illegal twos or
2
threes,” or “accessory units.” Due to the safety and habitability
considerations of “alter[ing] or modif[ying] of an existing building to
create an additional housing unit without first obtaining approval
from the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB),” the City
government devoted substantial resources to detecting and stopping
3
such illegal conversion. Recently, however, Mayor Bill de Blasio
proposed to legalize such illegal dwelling units to increase the City’s
4
rent-regulated housing stock. The question remains as to whether
crackdown or legalization is the right policy.
Such illegal housing is not unique to NYC. Shenzhen, a city in
south China that experienced a population explosion from 300,000 to
over 10 million within three decades, faces the same problem as NYC:
legal housing supply cannot catch up with the population growth,
5
resulting in prevalent illegal housing supply.
Almost half of
Shenzhen’s buildings have been built illegally and now host over eight
6
million migrant workers and low-income residents. In the past three
decades, the Shenzhen city government has swung between
legalization and crackdown of such illegal buildings, neither of which
7
has resolved the problem. Due to the large number of illegal
apartments, the “crackdown” option has proven to be impossible,
while legalization has incurred huge information costs and
encouraged more illegal constructions. In more recent years, though,
1. CHHAYA CMT. DEV. CORP., ILLEGAL DWELLING UNITS: A POTENTIAL SOURCE
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://chhayacdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Illegal-Dwelling-Units-A-PotentialSource-of-Affordable-Housing-in-New-York-City.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8G3NB7U] [hereinafter CHHAYA CDC].
2. Id.
3. Illegal Conversions, N.Y.C. BUILDINGS, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/
renter/illegal-conversions-vacates.page [https://perma.cc/8K2Q-8X7W] (last visited
Apr. 5, 2017).
4. Mireya Navarro, Looser Rules on Illegal Housing Sought, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/nyregion/looser-rules-on-illegalhousing-sought.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3U74-954B].
5. Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63 AM.
J. COMP. L. 197, 207–08 (2015).
6. Id. at 201.
7. See infra Section II.C.
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the Shenzhen city government has discovered an effective policy:
keeping the city government’s zoning power intact while granting an
8
option to owners of illegal housing to buy an exemption. The lesson
from Shenzhen is that options matter at least as much as the
allocation of initial entitlements. In the case of prevalent zoning
violations, these options should be granted to parties that have the
best information to make decisions—the numerous individual owners
rather than the government. I propose that this optional zoning
approach should be taken in dealing with illegal housing in New York
City.
Part I of this article details illegal housing in New York City,
including the three main challenges, namely, information costs,
externality, and heterogeneity in dealing with illegal housing. Part II
discusses how Shenzhen dealt with illegal buildings with the same
challenges. Part III concludes with a preliminary proposal of
community-based zoning options for New York City.
I. ILLEGAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK
Overcrowding and undersupply of affordable housing have led to a
9
surge in illegal apartments throughout NYC. The typical migrant
worker in Chinatown, Manhattan or Flushing, Queens is likely to live
10
in an illegal location under the current NYC zoning law. In Jackson
Heights, Queens, or similar neighborhoods, houses originally
designed for a nuclear family are being occupied by multiple
11
extended families, including cousins, aunts, and uncles. Resorting to
illegal housing is a problem not limited to immigrants. Even in the
Upper East Side of Manhattan, real estate brokers occasionally show
young professionals suspiciously low priced units which turned out to
12
be basements without independent mailboxes. The Pratt Center for
Community Development (Pratt Center) and Chhaya Community
Development Corporation (Chhaya CDC) estimated that between
300,000 and 500,000 New Yorkers live in housing units that do not

8. See infra Section II.C.3. For a more comprehensive picture on the Shenzhen
Government’s policies, see Qiao, supra note 5, at 207–12.
9. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3.
10. Interview with a worker in Chinatown, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 11, 2014).
11. Sarah Wesseler, Inequality and Informality in New York: SITU Studio’s
Proposal for MoMA’s Uneven Growth Exhibition, ARCH DAILY (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.archdaily.com/589157/inequality-and-informality-in-new-york-situ-studios-proposal-for-moma-s-uneven-growth-exhibition [https://perma.cc/6NZK-DSBP].
12. The author had such a personal experience.
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13

legally exist.
The Pratt Center report found that NYC gained
114,000 apartments not reflected in the official number of certificates
of occupancy the City granted for new construction or renovation
14
between 1990 and 2000. Chhaya CDC also conducted a door-todoor survey in Jackson Heights and the Briarwood/Jamaica section of
Queens and found that 35% of the total units examined (155 out of
15
446 homes) had separate secondary basement units. The Citizens
Housing and Planning Council estimated that nearly 42,000 new
housing units in Queens, none of which were recorded in the official
system, amounted to 73% of Queens’ total housing growth from 1990
16
to 2000.
According to the DOB, “an illegal conversion is an alteration or
modification of an existing building to create an additional housing
17
unit without first obtaining approval.” Examples of these illegal
conversions include creating (without obtaining approval or permits
from the DOB) an apartment in the basement, attic, or garage of a
property zoned or designated for manufacturing or industrial use, or
18
dividing an apartment into single room occupancies. New York
City has used ineffective law enforcement measures to combat the
19
growing prevalence of illegal housing. Although scholars and policy
advocates suggest legalization as a solution to this problem, it remains
20
unclear whether legalization is the best course of action either. I
examine both solutions in detail in the following sections.
A. Legal Enforcement: Too Many to Fail
The New York City government has strong incentive to take
measures to enforce the zoning and building codes. The government
has warned that illegal housing poses serious safety risks because noncompliance with Building and Fire Safety Codes creates potentially
21
unsafe living conditions. In addition, the overcrowding caused by

13. ROBERT NEUWIRTH, NEW YORK’S HOUSING UNDERGROUND: A REFUGE AND
RESOURCE 2–3 (Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev. & Chhaya Cmt. Dev. Corp., 2008)
[hereinafter PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT].
14. Id. at 1.
15. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 10.
16. Martha Galvez & Frank Braconi, New York’s Underground Housing, 9 URB.
PROSPECT
1,
2
(2013),
http://chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/UP_
Underground_Housing1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3G4-RRNR].
17. Illegal Conversions, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. See generally infra Section I.A.
20. See generally infra Section I.B.
21. Illegal Conversions, supra note 3.
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illegal housing may overburden surrounding essential services,
reducing a neighborhood’s quality of life, and local businesses may
suffer from further reduction of already-limited industrial and
22
manufacturing space in NYC.
It is possible to check the legal uses of a building by viewing the
building’s Certificate of Occupancy, which can be accessed through
23
the DOB website’s Buildings Information System.
However,
current enforcement of zoning and building codes occurs through a
complaint-based system where neighbors, tenants, and businesses
offering services to remove the violations may report suspected illegal
conversions by calling 3-1-1 and anonymously file complaints,
24
prompting a Buildings Inspector to inspect the property. Property
owners that are found in violation of zoning and building codes are
25
fined by the DOB. Because enforcement of building and zoning
codes substantially relies on neighbor and tenant complaints, the
system can perpetuate tension and distrust within local
26
communities. This distrust may be particularly salient because the
penalties for illegally converting a manufacturing or industrial space
27
for residential use can be as high as $24,000 for the first offense.
Although NYC collects revenues from these fines, the revenue is
unlikely to outweigh the costs of inspection, enforcement, housing
28
court hearings, and other related costs.
New York City has previously had minimal success in its attempts
to combat its illegal housing. For example, in March 1997, NYC
created a unit of thirteen Building Inspectors to ferret out illegal
conversions in Queens—the borough with the most complaints of
29
illegal conversions. Between 1996 and 1998 the number of violation
summonses issued across the city increased more than six-fold, from
30
But increased vigilance has its own
637 to 4,094 respectively.
complications. The insufficiency of manpower, the DOB officials’
lack of power to enter and vacate illegal buildings, and the absence of

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3.

Id.
Id.

Vivian S. Toy, Despite City Crackdown, Illegal and Overcrowded Apartments
Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/nyregion/
despite-city-crackdown-illegal-and-overcrowded-apartments-survive.html?page
wanted=2 [https://perma.cc/M69A-TECU].
30. Id.
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substitute housing all contributed to making serious enforcement
difficult.
First, there is simply inadequate manpower for code enforcement.
As revealed in the 2014 Queens Borough President Policy Statement:
Today, less than 300 inspectors are on staff citywide, with no staff
increase projected. A majority of complaints become response
delayed because of the inadequate number of inspectors. Because
of these staffing shortfalls, The Department of Buildings and the
Department of Housing Preservation and Development frequently
have a backlog of thousands of complaints.
Violations go
uncorrected, which could lead to building collapse and injuries, and
millions of dollars in fines go uncollected.
Without robust
enforcement, there is no deterrent to those involved in the illegal
conversion of housing or the exploitation of those in need of
31
affordable housing.

Second, enforcement officials cannot enter an apartment without a
warrant. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
32
housing owners and tenants from unreasonable searches.
In
Camara v. Municipal Court, 33 the Supreme Court held that
homeowners could refuse to allow housing inspectors access to their
34
personal residences until they have obtained a search warrant. This
can apply to homeowners with potential accessory dwelling units in
35
NYC.
The requirement of a warrant makes the verification of
illegality difficult. However, when investigations do reveal illegal
units, the government typically provides landlords with a “grace
period” to correct violations, unless the housing conditions are
36
dangerous or uninhabitable. Thus, even when a violation of zoning

31. MELINDA KATZ, THE OFFICE OF THE QUEENS BOROUGH PRESIDENT:
STRATEGY POLICY STATEMENT 2014 (2014), http://queensbp.org/Queens_Strategic_
Policy_Statement_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3AK-2STF].
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1 (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”); see also Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home:
Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2009).
33. 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
34. See George J. Castrataro, Housing Code Enforcement: A Century of Failure
in New York City, 14 N.Y. L. F. 60, 63–67 (1968).
35. See, e.g., Katie Honan, Half of Illegal Home Subdivision Complaints Are in
Queens, DNAINFO (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20141028/corona/more-than-half-of-illegal-subdivisions-are-queens-buildingsdept-says [https://perma.cc/NUV7-LKTB].
36. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 3.
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and building codes is verified, the government can only vacate a
premises if there is imminent danger.
The process of going to court over an alleged violation can be very
37
expensive.
However, if the government cannot evacuate the
38
property, residents will continue to stay there. On many occasions,
while the landlords violated the zoning and building codes, tenants
are forced to stay in the illegal premises. Some landlords use these
tenants to their advantage by continuing to collect rent from them to
39
help pay government fines. Absent owners may ignore summonses
40
and become repeat offenders to the DOB. Even worse, however, is
when landlords refer to the illegality of their housing as an excuse to
41
evict tenants.
Third, regardless of the convenience and effectiveness of the
procedure to eliminate such illegal housing, the NYC government
should still be concerned about residents of illegal housing who might
42
be otherwise homeless. Although the DOB is able to issue vacate
orders for dangerous dwellings, the Department rarely does so due to
43
the lack of relocation options. During all of fiscal year of 2002,
roughly two percent of the 10,000 complaints of illegal conversion to
44
the DOB resulted in a vacate order. Ed Hernandez, a co-chairman
of the Long Island Campaign for Affordable Housing, commented on
this problem in 2003 by stating, “if you crack down on one hand and
have no alternatives on the other, you’re just making the [housing]
45
crisis even more of a crisis.”
For all three reasons above, legal enforcement has not worked in
NYC. Despite government efforts, the number of illegal units has

37. See, e.g., Tessa Melvin, Legally or Not, 1-Family House Is Often Home To 2
Families, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/05/

realestate/legally-or-not-1-family-house-is-often-home-to-2-families.html
[https://perma.cc/2C7R-G29V] (reporting on a 1995 court case that took eleven
months and cost taxpayers $10,000 in legal fees).
38. Toy, supra note 29.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (providing the example of a tenant of an illegal housing unit who said “I
only get $552 a month in Social Security and my rent is $400, so where else am I going
to go?”).
43. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 3.
44. Id.
45. Vivian S. Toy, Unraveling the Issue of Illegal Apartments, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/nyregion/unraveling-the-issue-of-illegalapartments.html [https://perma.cc/58ML-DNVW].
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46

continued to increase through the decades.
Additionally, the
ineffectiveness of legal enforcement has not significantly improved
over the years. In 1997, then-Queens Borough President Claire
Schulman convened the Queens Illegal Conversion Task Force to
47
address the problem of illegal apartment conversions in Queens. Of
the ten houses with illegal apartments closely followed for a year by
this Illegal Conversion Task Force, all but two of the houses
continued to have illegal conditions, despite repeated citations and
48
fines. In at least five cases, the owners neither paid the fines nor
49
According to Patricia Dolan,
made changes to the property.
President of the Kew Gardens Hills Homeowners’ Civic Association,
“[w]e’ve got more inspectors and a lot more violations on the books,
but there’s still nothing to force compliance and make people correct
50
dangerous situations.”
B.

Legalization: Uncertain Effects

With the scarcity of affordable housing in NYC, some housing
advocates are calling for a new approach. Legalization is the other
way scholars and policy advocates have proposed to resolve the illegal
housing problem, and has made it onto the agenda of housing groups.
51
These advocates argue that legalizing at least some of these
illegally converted units by waiving certain legal requirements in
zoning and building codes would have a number of benefits for
52
NYC.
It would ensure fire safety and health compliance of
accessory units, reduce the cost of responding to complaints with
multiple inspections, and enhance ability to accommodate and plan
for population growth through allocation of resources to area public
schools, sanitation, parking capacity, and development. In response
to these advocates, Mayor Bill de Blasio has singled out illegal
basements and “granny flats” as possible additions to the city’s rent53
regulated housing stock, perhaps drawing on his experience living in

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 2.
Toy, supra note 29.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16; CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1;
PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13.
52. Navarro, supra note 4.
53. Esmé E. Deprez, Illegal NYC Homes Thrive as De Blasio Tackles Housing,

BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-1121/illegal-nyc-homes-thrive-as-de-blasio-tackles-housing
[https://perma.cc/64V379HF].
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a questionably legal basement apartment in Astoria, Queens, in the
54
1980s.
However, it remains unclear how de Blasio is going to
legalize such illegal housing. According to the NYC Housing Plan:
There are thousands of unsanctioned housing units across the city,
primarily in basements and above garages. The conditions of these
units may represent a threat to health and safety of their occupants
and to the first responders who may be called to respond to
emergencies in those units. The engineering and fire safety
challenges created by these units are extremely complex. The City
will work with the relevant stakeholders to examine how best to
bring these units into the regulated housing system, including a
review of other cities’ best practices to bring fresh ideas to the
55
discussion.

The Pratt Center and Chhaya CDC recommend NYC “offer
landlords who agree to legalize their basement apartments as
accessory dwelling units a reasonable (e.g., 12–18 month) grace
period during which they will not be subject to penalties for illegal
56
occupancy under the Building Code.”
They also recommend
strengthened enforcement and financial assistance to illegal housing
57
landlords and tenants, to encourage compliance. It seems to be a
majority opinion among scholars and policy makers that legalization
58
should occur. The American Planning Association (APA) has even
59
provided a model code for legalization. Scholars have examined the
60
political opposition to legalization, but the consequences of
legalization have not been examined in detail and therefore might be
not as simple of a solution as it seems. As acknowledged by the APA
report, owners of Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) “strongly resist
legalization out of their fear of higher property taxes, legal sanctions,
income taxes on rental income, the costs of conforming to local codes,

54. Navarro, supra note 4.
55. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TENYEAR PLAN 47 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/
housing_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCX5-YBG5].
56. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
57. See id. at 1.
58. See, e.g., DAN HAFETZ ET AL., BACKGROUND GUIDE ON HOW TO LEGALIZE
CELLAR APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2009), https://basecampaign.files.
wordpress.com/2013/06/background-guide-on-how-to-legalize-cellar-apartments-innew-york-city-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B397-DBQX].
59. See RODNEY L. COBB & SCOTT DVORAK, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS:
MODEL STATE ACT AND LOCAL ORDINANCE (2000), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
consume/d17158_dwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/L87U-VJJ5].
60. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own?
Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW. 519 (2013).

722

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

and the possibility that code inspectors will discover a variety of code
violations. For these reasons, programs to accommodate illegal
61
ADUs have not been very successful.”
Many communities in Westchester County, New York, and
Connecticut have pursued legalization programs as a response to the
special problems of elderly people owning large homes and the
62
increasing number of young people seeking to buy or rent housing.
There were also a few legalization programs in towns on Long Island,
New York, but residents questioned whether any illegal landlord
would voluntarily submit to paying the required fee and having his or
63
her property inspected. In Suffolk County, New York, the Town of
Babylon and its incorporated village of Lindenhurst have amended
64
their zoning codes to legalize accessory apartments. Although each
of these suggested legalization programs have implemented a system
65
of permits and fees to allow for conversions, planning officials in
these towns and counties have noted that compliance has been slow.
66
Residents who converted their homes before these codes took
effect (when it was still illegal) are particularly slow to comply with
new codes because of the fear that municipalities will require costly
renovations to their apartments to conform to approved standards,
67
and the fear of disapproval from surrounding neighbors. In essence,
68
legalization programs in the 1980s were predominantly failures. For
example, a legalization program in Old Tappan, New Jersey, was met
69
with a disappointingly meager number of applications. In the codes

61. COBB & DVORAK, supra note 59, at 49–50.
62. Id. (adapting a proposal for ADU legalization from a 1995 draft of the Village
of Scarsdale, New York’s Zoning Code, §4.7.1.g. of South Winsor, Connecticut’s 1990
Zoning Ordinance, and §701 m of Hamden, Connecticut’s 1996 Zoning Regulations).
63. See Bret Senft, Restricting Illegal Apartments, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1989)，
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/24/nyregion/restricting-illegal-apartments.html
[https://perma.cc/XCP4-XW64].
64. Article II: Accessory Apartments in One-Family Dwellings, 1995 Babylon
Local Law No. 14, Babylon Admin. Legislation §153, art. II., http://ecode360.com/
6808107 [https://perma.cc/CB6S-UHDM] (“It is the purpose of this article to
encourage the residents of our community who require accessory apartments to
legally remain in the Town of Babylon.”).
65. See supra notes 63 and 64 (and accompanying text).
66. Gene Rondinaro, Illegal Accessory Units Trouble Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
3,
1985),
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/03/realestate/illegal-accessory-unitstrouble-suburbs.html [https://perma.cc/FB8V-QC9H].
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. (noting how Old Tappan’s then-mayor commented how the lack of
applications was “a shame when there is now a perfectly legal method of having it
done”).
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written to address the legalization programs, local governments often
outlined comprehensive procedures to ensure the quality and safety
of the legalized buildings and to charge the owners a fee for the
legalization. Although both requirements are reasonable, many
illegal housing owners did not like the extra financial burden, and
70
therefore would not cooperate. What is more, legalization policies
and laws might be tailored to address the concern of legal housing
owners in the neighborhood, resulting in stricter compliance
requirements. These compliance requirements might further deter
71
illegal housing owners from applying for legalization.
Although there have been some seemingly successful legalization
programs, the amount of illegal housing that such programs have
addressed, and the scale of such programs, are too small to
adequately assess whether these programs could be successful in New
York City. For example, Santa Cruz’s ADU Development Program,
which has won numerous awards and has been used as a model by
72
other communities, averages forty to fifty ADU permits per year.
Similarly, Barnstable, Massachusetts’ Accessory Affordable
Apartment or Amnesty Program, part of their Affordable Housing
Plan from 2000, has also been highlighted as an exemplary way to
bring the high number of existing illegal ADUs into compliance with
73
current requirements. While the program has been successful in
converting existing illegal accessory apartments into code-compliant
ADUs, in the eight years after its inception, Barnstable has approved
74
only 160 affordable ADUs—roughly twenty ADUs per year. Going
at these rates, it would take more than 2,000 years in Santa Cruz, and
5,000 years in Barnstable to legalize the 100,000 illegal apartments
75
estimated by The Pratt Center and Chhaya CDC.
In sum, the NYC government would have more manpower and
higher capacity to deal with illegal housing if similar programs were
adopted, but the small numbers in the so-called successful programs
discussed above do not provide a solid basis to make predictions.
Instead, the information costs, politics over externality, and
heterogeneity of the illegal housing sector would be much more
70. See id.
71. See Senft, supra note 63.
72. See generally U.S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS:
CASE
STUDY
(2008),
http://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/adu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KR8A-WNLW].
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id.
75. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3.
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significant and complicated in NYC than in these small towns and
cities where implementation has been moderately successful.
C.

Challenges to Illegal Housing in New York City

1.

Information Costs

Concealed within the City’s seemingly endless rows of apartment
buildings, townhouses, and high-rises is a network of typologies that
have adapted, subdivided, or converted existing spaces to
accommodate the growing number of individuals who cannot find a
76
place to live within the formal housing market.
With owners
unwilling to reveal that they have these units for fear of being cited
with a violation and tenants not daring to report possible unsafe
conditions for fear of eviction, it is not easy to quantify just how many
of these underground units exist in New York City and what they
77
look like. Information cost is an obvious challenge to dealing with
the illegal housing issue in New York City. This information cost
refers not only to gathering information about buildings, but also to
information about the social relations surrounding housing, including
renting contracts and property arrangements. New York courts have
addressed various issues of illegal housing, such as whether a landlord
78
is liable for a tenant’s illegal conversions, whether a tenant of an
illegal apartment is entitled to the government’s relocation
79
assistance, and whether owners could recover value of use and
80
occupancy of premises in illegal conversion. These cases testify to
the complicated property and social arrangements involved in illegal
housing. A top-down and unified approach to deal with problems of
illegal housing would require cooperation and information from
illegal housing owners and tenants.

2.

Externality

Although city planners might perceive economic and social
benefits of ADUs, surrounding neighbors often fear the exact
opposite. They fear that the increased density and traffic in their
neighborhoods resulting from the units will cause a decline in their

76. See Wesseler, supra note 11.
77. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
78. See Matter of Kurtin v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 473, 911 N.Y.S.2d 40
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
79. See Matter of Smith v. Donovan, 61 A.D.3d 505, 878 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2009).
80. See Caldwell v. American Package, 57 A.D.3d 15, 866 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008).
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81

property values.
In fact, neighborhood residents dislike illegal
housing so much that they voluntarily “police the community” for
82
illegal renters in the absence of legal enforcement. Residents’ fears
have some merit, however, as additional housing imposes a
disproportionate drain on municipal services such as roads, sanitary
83
services, and schools.

3.

Heterogeneity

The conditions of illegal housing in New York City, as revealed by
Chhaya CDC, vary case-by-case. Some illegal housing conditions are
safe and meet the Building Code, some could easily be made safe and
habitable, and some are fundamentally inappropriate for habitation—
lacking natural light, proper ventilation, or safe forms of egress—and
84
could not be made habitable without major renovations. Chhaya
CDC surveyors found “many tenants living in dangerous and
extremely overcrowded conditions in units with dilapidated ceilings,
poor electrical wiring, and tight living quarters with multiple uses that
85
seemed unsafe for habitation.” Naturally, these units in serious
violation of building safety codes would require significantly more
work to become compliant with the law.
Residents of illegal housing also vary. There are tenants who live
in accessory housing temporarily, but also tenants have been living in
86
accessory units for many years. Families who have been living in
ADUs for several years are considered an integral part of the local
87
Their children are enrolled in local schools, they
community.
worship in local faith institutions, have family or established

81. See Frank Bruni & Deborah Sontag, Behind a Suburban Facade in Queens, A
Teeming, Angry Urban Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1996),

http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/08/nyregion/behind-a-suburban-facade-in-queens-ateeming-angry-urban-arithmetic.html [https://perma.cc/N2J6-JY6G] (quoting a
community resident who stated: “The house that used to send two kids to school
sends eight . . . . This has created havoc with the quality of life in our community.”);
Morris Newman, Focus: Riverside, Calif.; The Welcome Mat’s Out for ‘Granny
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
25,
1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/
Flats’,
08/25/realestate/focus-riverside-calif-the-welcome-mat-s-out-for-granny-flats.html
[https://perma.cc/5PHN-JP85].
82. See Marcelle S. Fischler, Fighting In-Home Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/realestate/14lizo.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&ad
xnnlx=1428895208fJGAPZc9XzdYAjsfJwethg [https://perma.cc/FNY5-HVZT].
83. Id.
84. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 4.
85. Id. at 9 (noting one instance of an individual spending twelve years in his
friend’s home).
86. Toy, supra note 45.
87. See id.
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friendships with residents in the community, and are, in many cases,
88
happy with their communities.
Social classes of illegal housing
tenants also vary, where some tenants of ADUs are unauthorized
immigrants, unemployed, and/or on welfare, and some are also
89
teachers, nurses or workers at hospitals.
There are therefore also differences in the interests and
preferences of illegal housing owners. Some owners want to get legal
90
title for these units; some simply may not care. The Chhaya CDC
calls for further research that would help facilitate the integration of
illegal housing into the law, “including the projected cost of
conversion for [the] average unit, a comparative assessment of
increase[s] in tax liabilities, costs of conversion versus income
91
generated, and impact on long-term property value”;
and,
additionally, a “comparative analysis of time and resources for an
owner to proactively legalize versus responding to a complaint of
92
illegal use.” Such costs would vary by circumstance, and it would be
difficult to give a unified answer for city-wide illegal housing. This
variance explains why some people say they would be the first to
apply for legalization if there is such a program but, on the other hand,
93
many existing programs have had very limited success.
II. LESSONS FROM SHENZHEN
Shenzhen is a city similar in size to New York City. However, it
faces an even bigger problem of illegal housing because almost half of
the housing in Shenzhen is built in violation of zoning and building
94
codes, and therefore illegal. In the past three decades the Shenzhen
city government has implemented various measures to deal with
illegal housing while facing the same challenges arising from
information costs, externality, and heterogeneity as in New York
95
City.
As such, New York City can learn from Shenzhen’s
experiences dealing with illegal housing. In this Part, I apply Ian

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id.
See id.
See supra Section I.B.
CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
Cf. Elissa Gootman, What Lies Behind Door No. 2? In This Town, Don’t
Even Ask, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/15/nyregion/

what-lies-behind-door-no-2-in-this-town-don-t-even-ask.html [https://perma.cc/484X6C8R].
94. Qiao, supra note 5, at 210.
95. See infra Section II.C.
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96

Ayre’s optional law framework, which is an expansion of Guido
97
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s structure of legal entitlements
to analyze illegal housing and adverse zoning, i.e., private
construction and land use against governmental zoning and building
codes. This new “optional zoning” approach can be applied to
analyze the practices of Shenzhen for the past three decades, which
adopted five of the six rules under the optional zoning framework in
dealing with illegal housing. The most cost-effective solution is to
grant call options, rather than titles to illegal housing owners.
A. Comparability
Table 1. Comparison of New York City and Shenzhen
Population in
Population
Land
Illegal
Housing
300,000 to
783.8 square
98
New York
8,491,079
99
100
500,000
km
City
Up to 8
1996.8 square
101
10,628,900
102
103
Shenzhen
million
km
Situated immediately north of Hong Kong, in the southern part of
China’s Guangdong Province, Shenzhen has been considered the
104
symbolic heart of the Chinese economic reform.
In 1980, Deng
Xiaoping, the then supreme leader of China, designated Shenzhen
(then an agriculture county of about 300,000 farmers named Bao’An)
as a “special economic zone” (SEZ) to pilot market-oriented
105
reforms.
Since the establishment of the SEZ, Shenzhen has
boomed into economic growth and urbanization. From 1979 to 2010,
96. See generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL
ENTITLEMENTS 1–4 (2005).
97. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
98. See Department of City Planning of New York, Census Bureau Estimates for
July 1, 2014, Population: Current Population Estimates, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml [https://perma.cc/N58V-9UDJ].
99. See State & County QuickFacts: New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2,
2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html [https://perma.cc/TZ66CLBT].
100. See PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
101. STATISTICS BUREAU OF SHENZHEN CITY & SHENZHEN SURVEY OFFICE OF
THE STATE STATISTICS BUREAU, SHENZHEN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2014, § 1.1.2
(2014), http://www.sztj.gov.cn/nj2014/indexce.htm [https://perma.cc/5G9Z-EC3S].
102. Id.
103. Qiao, supra note 5, at 197, 201.
104. Id. at 207.
105. Id.
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the annual average growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
106
in Shenzhen was 25.3%.
Shenzhen ranked fourth in GDP and first
107
The
in GDP per capita among mainland Chinese cities in 2009.
population of Shenzhen has grown from 314,100 in 1979, of whom
312,600 had local hukou (household registration), to 10,372,000 in
108
2010, of whom only 2,510,300 had local hukou.
The exponential population growth also brought huge demand for
109
housing, but there was no housing crisis like in New York City.
In
Shenzhen, housing prices are significantly more expensive than can be
110
afforded by the majority of the population.
Most of the eight
million migrant workers in Shenzhen actually stay in illegal housing,
111
Such
which composes 47.57% of the total floor space of Shenzhen.
housing is illegal because it violates land use regulations and building
codes. Illegal land development has played an indispensable role in
112
the rapid economic growth of Shenzhen.
B.

Optional Zoning

Zoning is the right of the government to control land and building
use. Adverse possession is when an individual possesses property
owned by someone else without his or her permission until the statute
of limitations expires for the owner to recover possession, which
allows the adverse possessor to acquire a root of title to that already113
owned property.
American law often requires that possession must
be exclusive, open and notorious, actual, continuous, and adverse

106. SHENZHEN STATISTICS BUREAU & NBS SURVEY OFFICE IN SHENZHEN,
SHENZHEN STATISTICAL 5 (2011).
107. ZHENG LE, THE PATH OF SHENZHEN 16 (2010).
108. See SHENZHEN STATISTICS BUREAU & NBS SURVEY OFFICE IN SHENZHEN,
supra note 106, at 4.
109. See generally Shitong Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate
Market without Legal Titles, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 253, 258–59 (2014).
110. In August 2015, the average housing price in Shenzhen is 38000 RMB (USD
5960) per square meters, and the average annual salary in Shenzhen is 72,648 RMB
(USD 11,394). It would take an average salary-earner in Shenzhen fifty-two years to
buy a 100-square-meter apartment, assuming he does not spend his salary on
anything else. See Cankaoxiaoxi ( 参 考 消 息 ), Gangmei: Hushen Mingzhong
Buchibuhe 50 nian cai gou Mai 100 pingmi Fang (港媒:沪深民众不吃不喝 50 年才够

买 100 平米房) [It Takes Residents in Shanghai and Shenzhen 50 Years Without
Eating or Drinking to Buy a 100-Square-Meter Apartment], SINA NEWS (Sept. 17,

2015),
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/zs/2015-09-17/doc-ifxhytwr2121287.shtml
[https://perma.cc/45VM-WSE6].
111. See Qiao, supra note 5.
112. See generally Qiao, supra note 109, at 270–71.
113. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO
U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 34 (2010).
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114

under a claim of right.
Illegal land use can, therefore, be called
“adverse zoning” by land users by applying the adverse possession
115
concept to government-held property interests.
We can explore
how to structure the legal entitlements between illegal land users and
116
the government under the framework of adverse possession.
The concept of adverse possession can be extended beyond the
possession of things. For example, the revival of recent research on
adverse possession was partly attributed to a California Supreme
117
Court decision about prescriptive easement.
Related to adverse
possession, prescription is “the effect of lapse of time in creating or
118
extinguishing property interests.”
It is based on the theory that if
“one makes non-permissive use of another’s land, and the landowner
fails to prevent such use, such acquiescence is conclusive evidence
119
that the user is rightful”.
A prescriptive easement is created “by
such use of land, for the period of prescription, as would be privileged
if an easement existed, provided its use is (1) adverse, and (2) for the
120
period of prescription, continuous and uninterrupted.”
Thomas Merrill calls prescriptive easement a first cousin of adverse
121
possession.
Prescriptive easement and adverse possession are
different in that the former involves non-possessory use of property,
which ripens into an easement, and the latter involves possession of
122
property, which ripens into a fee simple.
Though the nonpossessory nature of an easement generally means that the continuity
and exclusivity elements should be interpreted differently than in a
case of adverse possession, the same legal requirements apply to both
adverse possession and prescriptive easements. Scholars often do not
distinguish too sharply between the rules of legal entitlements under
123
adverse possession and prescriptive easement.
Because adverse
114. Id. at 35.
115. Scott Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver &
Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 558 (2011).
116. See id.
117. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773 (Cal. 1984); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1122–54 (1985).
118. William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79,
86 (1996).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 86–87.
121. Merrill, supra note 117, at 1124.
122. Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 118, at 88.
123. Id.
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possession plays a more significant role in property law, discussions of
“the effect of lapse of time in creating or extinguishing property
interests” are more often under the framework of adverse possession.
As Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed wrote, the first issue
124
that any legal system must face is the problem of “entitlement.”
When presented with conflicting interests of two or more individuals
or groups of individuals, a state must decide which side to favor and
125
the kind of protection to grant to that side.
Calabresi and Melamed
define three types of entitlements—entitlements protected by
property rules, entitlements protected by liability rules, and
126
inalienable entitlements.
Property rules protect entitlements by
127
As such, an entitlement is
deterring nonconsensual takings.
protected by a property rule when an individual who wants to take an
entitlement from another must buy it from a voluntary seller at an
128
agreed upon price.
Liability rules, on the other hand, protect
entitlements by compensating the entitlement holder when such
129
takings in fact occur.
Therefore, an entitlement is protected by a
liability rule when an individual who wants to take an entitlement
from another can destroy the initial entitlement if the individual is
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.
Merrill first applied the Calabresi-Melamed framework to analyze
130
adverse possession.
Adopting this approach to analyzing adverse
zoning, the state can choose among four different rules.
Table 2: Calabresi and Melamed’s Two-by-Two Box Applied to
131
Adverse Zoning
Method of Protection
Initial Entitlement
Property Rule
Liability Rule
The Government
Rule 1
Rule 2
Adverse Zoners
Rule 3
Rule 4
 Rule 1:
Government prohibits adverse zoning—the
government’s zoning cannot be violated.
 Rule 2: Government has the zoning power, but individuals can
violate it by paying compensation.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 97, at 1090–92.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
AYRES, supra note 96, at 5.
Id.
Id.
See Merrill, supra note 117.
For a similar table, see AYRES, supra note 96, at 14.
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Rule 3: Government recognizes adverse zoning without
requirements of compensation.
Rule 4: Government recognizes adverse zoning, but can get rid
of it by compensating individuals.

The Calabresi and Melamed categorization has since dominated
the discussions of legal entitlements—scholars have discussed
different aspects of these rules, tried to expand their content, and
132
even invented new rules.
Among many others, Ian Ayres
significantly expanded the content of liability rules by introducing
133
option theory into this field.
To define an option, it must be
determined who has the option, whether the option is to buy (a “call
option”) or to sell (a “put option”), and the price of exercising the
134
option.
The individual who has the call option can force a sale at
135
this exercise price, even if the seller does not want to sell.
According to Ayres, traditional liability rules that give at least one
party an option to take an entitlement non-consensually and pay the
entitlement owner some exercise price gives potential takers a call
option. With this new conception of traditional liability rules as
granting a potential taker a call option, academics began
conceptualizing put options in this context. Here, put options would
give the option holder the choice of whether to be paid a nonnegotiated amount, giving rise to “forced purchases.”
Applied to adverse zoning, the possibility of put options suggests
two additional rules:



Rule 5: Government grants titles to adverse zoners, but also
gives them the option of waiving their titles in return for
compensation from the government.
Rule 6: Government not only can keep its entitlement to
zoning, but also has the option to give up its entitlement and
receive compensation from adverse zoners.

132. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex
Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Pliability Rule, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability
Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Saul Levmore,
Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE.
L.J. 2149 (1997).
133. See AYRES, supra note 96, at 5–15.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 15.
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Incorporating the possibility of “put-option” rules, the structure of
legal entitlements in adverse zoning is as following:
Table 3: Ayres’ Two-by-Three Box Applied to Adverse Zoning
Method of Protection

136

Liability Rule
Initial
Property Rule
Liability Rule
Put Option
Entitlement
Call Option
The
Rule 1
Rule 2
Rule 6
Government
Adverse
Rule 3
Rule 4
Rule 5
Zoners
According to the distribution of assets and options, the structure of
legal entitlements in adverse zoning can be depicted as follows:
137

Table 4: Ayres’ Table of Claims Applied to Adverse Zoning
Govt’s Claim
AZ’s Claim
Rule 1
Zoning
0
Rule 2
Zoning - Call Option
Call Option
Rule 3
0
Adverse Zoning
Rule 4
Call Option
Adverse Zoning Call Option
Rule 5
- Put Option
Adverse Zoning +
Put Option
Rule 6
Zoning + Put Option
- Put Option
C.

Practices in Shenzhen

In Shenzhen, each village has a shareholding co-op at the core their
community. These co-ops are responsible for managing the collective
development land and issue dividends to villagers at the end of each
138
The income generated by the land funds a variety of public
year.
works. Members of village co-op boards are typically well-known
figures in the community, creating a sense of familiarity and giving
the co-ops intimate knowledge of local property arrangements,
knowledge that external government branches would otherwise be
139
In addition to their superior access, co-ops
unable to access.

136.
137.
138.
139.

For a similar table, see id.
See id. at 17.
Qiao, supra note 109, at 260.
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DEALING WITH ILLEGAL HOUSING

2016]

733

benefit from fewer formal constraints than other government
140
entities.
Village co-ops are willing to provide information and support for
illegal housing transactions because of economic incentives. They
keep records of village building histories in the form of property
maps, meeting minutes, or sales receipts, and determine property
141
rights in illegal buildings.
It is the village co-ops that decide and
coordinate how much to build in the villages, and represent villagers
142
in negotiating with the government on rezoning.
As early as in 1982, the Shenzhen government tried to make a
143
feasible plan to deal with the illegal rural houses.
In dealing with
the village co-ops, the Shenzhen government has tried five of the six
144
rules under optional zoning framework in the past decades.
The
only missing rule in the Shenzhen government policies, Rule 5, is
actually applicable to a certain group of cases.
Shenzhen
demonstrates that neither Rule 1 nor Rule 3 works in dealing with
adverse zoning—to demolish illegal housing is too costly to achieve
and granting illegal housing legal titles for free encourages more
145
illegal land use.
Instead, it is more cost-effective and feasible to
grant the government the initial entitlement to zoning, rather than
individual land users, and therefore Rule 2 (granting call options to
146
illegal housing owners) is the most efficient policy.
In the following
section, I present a detailed analysis of the six rules in Shenzhen.

1.

Neither Legal Enforcement nor Legalization Works: The
Limitation of Rule 1, Rule 3, and Rule 6

Legal enforcement, i.e., Rule 1, has proved to be too costly for the
government. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the Shenzhen
government promulgated a series of regulations to deal with illegal
147
land use.
However, in the face of prevalent illegal land use, the
government’s enforcement power seemed limited. A typical illegal
building demolition involves dozens of government employees,

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 260–61.
Id. at 261.
Id.

SHENZHEN CITY GOVERNMENT, STIPULATIONS ON STRICTLY PROHIBITING
PRIVATE AND NON-PLANNING HOUSING BUILDING WITHIN THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE 1 (Mar. 29, 1982).
144. See infra Sections II.C.1–C.3.
145. See infra Section II.C.2.
146. See infra Section II.C.3.
147. Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Adverse Possession and Optional Law, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 290, 303–06 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
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including construction workers who are responsible for demolition
148
and policemen who maintain order during the demolition.
Each
demolition is a battle between the government and villagers, which
149
Despite the time and energy
frequently results in bloody conflicts.
put into each demolition, the number of illegal buildings continued to
150
increase over time.
From 1999 to 2010, the number of illegal
151
The huge expense of
buildings grew from 221,600 to 348,400.
demolition has become unaffordable for the government. In March
of 2013, the local People’s Congress published a draft of “Regulation
of Land Use Monitoring,” which required the owners of illegal
buildings to pay the demolition fees. In order to do that, the
Department of Land Use Monitoring could take the owners’
properties, such as automobiles, legal real estate, and bank savings, as
152
lien.
Although the Shenzhen government may have circumvented the
costs of demolition, the larger issue is that illegal housing is too
interconnected with the normal functioning of the city to fail. These
buildings essentially provide affordable shelter to the middle-and-low
income population, such as taxi drivers, factory workers, and even
young white-collar workers, and sometime even space for small high153
tech start-ups.
Rents of such illegal buildings are also the main
income of over 300,000 indigenous villagers, whose interests cannot
154
be easily disregarded.
After legal enforcement proved to be ineffective, the Shenzhen city
government also tried legalization. Its free-titling policy, which is
essentially Rule 3, has been mainly limited to a “one household, one
155
house” policy.
This legalization policy also failed. In addition to

148. Fu Ke ( 付 可 ), Shenzhen Chaichu Sifang zao Dizhi Duoming Jingcha
Shoushang ( 深 圳 拆 除 私 房 遭 抵 制 多 名 警 察 受 伤 ) [Many Polices Got Hurt in
Demolition of Private Houses], S. METROPOLITAN DAILY (Jan. 23, 2007),

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2007-01-23/115112115150.shtml [https://perma.cc/K7LCWQST].
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. SHENZHEN CITY GOVERNMENT, INVESTIGATION REPORT ON ILLEGAL
BUILDINGS IN SHENZHEN 26 (2010) (on file with the author).
152. Peng Yan (彭琰), Qiangchai Feiyong you Weijianren Chu (强拆费用由违建人

出) [New Regulations Draft Require Owners of Illegal Buildings to Pay for the
Demolition
Expenses],
SHENZHEN COM. DAILY
(Mar.
12,
2013),

http://szsb.sznews.com/html/2013-03/12/content_2401448.htm
[https://perma.cc/6K3M-JSFU].
153. Qiao, supra note 109, at 266.
154. Id. at 15.
155. SHENZHEN CITY GOVERNMENT, supra note 151.
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effectively encouraging illegal land use, the Shenzhen government
gained very little revenue from this policy and was embarrassed that
156
its policy benefited law-violators rather than law-abiders.
First, villagers had to devote substantial resources to obtain a
permit to build a house, regardless of whether they had already built
157
one or not.
Getting a permit sometimes depended on how a
“household” is defined. One house could be divided into two
households just to get the benefits from the “one household, one
158
house” policy.
Many resources were spent on lobbying and bribing
159
government officials with authority to issue such permits.
Second,
many people viewed this and other policies which provide
mechanisms for villagers to legalize their illegal real estate as a signal
that the government was unable to enforce harsh demolition rules
160
Villagers
and would have to grant legal titles to all illegal buildings.
responded with more illegal land use to secure their claims of rights in
161
the possible situation of free-titling-for-all.
This desire to secure
property in case of free titling was the main reason that each time the
Shenzhen government initiated a campaign to deal with illegal
162
buildings, there was a burst of illegal land use.
The Shenzhen government also promulgated a local regulation
allowing villagers to keep their illegal houses after paying fines and
land-use fees—essentially Rule 6 under the optional zoning
framework. The comprehensive plan included standards of fines and
fees that were again set according to owners’ identities and the total
areas of the buildings, and the plan provided that legal title for each

156. Qiao, supra note 147, at 308.
157. See Xie Xiaoguo et al. (谢孝国 等), Shenzhenshi Jianzhu 4 cheng Weigui, Liyi
Jituan Youshui Shizhang (深圳市建筑 4 成违规 利益集团游说市长) [40% of

Shenzhen’s Buildings are Illegal, Interest Groups Lobby the Mayor of Shenzhen for
Illegal Buildings], YANG CHEN EVENING NEWSPAPER (Feb. 24, 2010),
http://www.fwwwd.com/content/2010-02/24/content_4412896_3.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZB68-RYK6]; Sun Zhongchun (孙中春), Shenzhen Longgang Jiedao “Shequ ti

Xiaochanquanfang Shenqing Fugongpai” (深圳龙岗街道“社区替小产权房申请复工牌
”) [Street Office Applied for License to Build Small-Property Houses], SHENZHEN

EVENING NEWSPAPER (Oct. 18, 2010), http://szhome.oeeee.com/a/20101018/
316592_2.html [https://perma.cc/QYR5-663C].
158. See Foreign Capital Involved in Illegal Housing in Shenzhen: Even Tycoons

Are

Selling

Uniformly

Constructed

Buildings

(深圳违建房竟有“外资”介入 富豪也倒卖统建楼), NEW EXPRESS (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://szhome.oeeee.com/html/201309/13/18669.html [https://perma.cc/W6FF-C2V9].
159. Xie Xiaoguo et al., supra note 157.
160. Qiao, supra note 147, at 307–08.
161. Id. at 308.
162. Id.
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illegal building would have a price after calculation.
Owners of
illegal buildings were required to apply for legal titles from the
government within one year of the decree’s promulgation, giving the
Shenzhen government information on illegal buildings within its
164
jurisdiction.
This did not work out well. The regulation was made
in 2001, and it took the Shenzhen government nine years to gather its
first detailed report on illegal buildings, only to conclude that, despite
substantial efforts, the regulation had not been well received by illegal
housing owners. Although there were other owners of illegal
buildings who applied for legalization, by 2010, only about one
quarter of the 221,600 illegal buildings built before 1999 were granted
legal titles, and the total number of illegal buildings had increased to
165
348,400.
The information costs required to enforce the put-option liability
rule are too high for the government to enforce. The government
would need to impossibly accumulate all the information on all illegal
buildings within its jurisdiction. While physical information regarding
the location, height and floor areas are not difficult to collect, the
collection of information regarding the history, quality, and other less
166
tangible characters of the illegal buildings are very costly.
Even
more costly than these intangible factors is collecting information
regarding the social and economic relations of the illegal buildings
(e.g., who owns them, and who should get legal title).
The most costly information gathering, however, is determining
how much an owner values their property. The cost of strategic
bargaining could be prohibitively high, particularly when the
government exercised its put option and thus had no opportunity to
know the owner’s evaluation. For owners of illegal buildings, the
complicated titling procedures imposed high information costs on
them and fostered distrust of the government, both of which might
prevent owners from even thinking about whether the fees and fines
167
charged by the government are reasonable.

163. SHENZHEN PEOPLE’S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE, STIPULATIONS ON
HISTORICAL ILLEGAL PRODUCTION AND COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS 34 (2001).
164. See id.
165. SHENZHEN CITY GOVERNMENT, supra note 151, at 28–29.
166. Qiao, supra note 147, at 310.
167. In conversations that occurred during the author’s eleven-month fieldwork in
China from August 27, 2011 to July 5, 2012, for example, several government officials
commented that the fees and fines for a particular group of villagers were not high at
all, while villagers in this particular group did not understand the government policies
and were told by their friends that the government would charge a lot of money for
granting titles to their buildings. The amounts of both sides differed a hundredfold.
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In summary, there might be a price that both the government and
adverse zoners would accept for legalization of the illegal buildings,
but the government’s put option is too costly to exercise it. To make
sure that the price was set right, the government had to design
complicated rules, which in turn caused great information costs to
villagers.

2.

Too Expensive for the Government to Buy: The Limitation of
Rule 4 and Rule 5

Under Rule 4, the government can grant legal titles to owners of
illegally developed buildings, but retains the option to take these
buildings provided it compensates the owners. The Shenzhen
government has tried this approach in fulfilling its obligation to
provide affordable housing.
Although the Chinese central
government has required local governments to build low-income
public housing, the Shenzhen government did not have enough land
168
to comply.
The Shenzhen government found that, rather than
developing extra houses, requisitioning small-property houses might
more appropriate for their city where most low-income people lived
169
in illegal housing.
Under this plan, setting a proper price is also a
key issue. Social conflicts would arise if the government insisted on
requisitioning the illegal houses with too little compensation. The
costs of information and bargaining to set the proper price could be
high. On the other hand, the Shenzhen government could not afford
to purchase over 400 million square meters of illegal buildings at a
170
reasonable price.
Regardless, the goal of “requisitioning illegal
buildings for public housing” is questionable. If illegal housing was
adequate public housing and indeed served as homes to low-income
population through the small-property market, why should the
government become the owner?
Under Rule 5, adverse zoners would not only have the legal title,
but would also have an option to waive their titles in return for
government compensation. The Shenzhen government has not
171
adopted such a rule in dealing with illegal land use in its history.

168. Qiao, supra note 147, at 313.
169. Id.
170. Id. (explaining a situation where the Shenzhen government requisitioned a
small-property building at about one-third the price of buildings in the surrounding
area, which was enough to cover construction costs and keep a small profit).
171. Id. at 314–15.
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Optional Zoning That Works: Rule 2

Of the six adverse zoning rules, the most successful and promising
solution has been Rule 2, wherein the government keeps its
entitlement to zoning, but adverse zoners can take it by paying
172
compensation.
The use of this rule emerged over time through
173
In the process
Shenzhen’s various village redevelopment projects.
of redeveloping villages where illegal land development was prevalent,
the Shenzhen government insisted that only legally-developed land
could be redeveloped and only legally-built houses could be
174
compensated.
However, it was clear to the government and other
individuals that village redevelopment, regardless of whether it was
on legally-developed land, would bring big profits through
175
modernization.
Because of this realization, the government began
to ignore whether redeveloped buildings were legal or illegal as long
as the project can supply 20% of its land to the government for free
and develop another 12% of land for public roads and other public
176
facilities.
While the government has the entitlement to regulating and
limiting development on the land, Rule 2 provides an option for the
villagers to pay the fixed price (i.e., 32% of its land) to the
177
government for legal rights to develop the remaining land.
In this
scenario, the government does not need to do much—because the
villagers know the value of their land best, the government should not
have to waste resources to find this information. Compared with the
reluctance received by other legalization plans, villagers have actively
applied for village redevelopment, resulting in 342 projects between
2009 and 2012 involving 30 square kilometers of illegally-developed
land, and in 2011 alone such projects contributed almost 40% of
178
newly-developed residential housing in 2011.
This rule differs from the government’s put-option liability rule in
several key aspects. First, this approach places the decision-making
power with villagers, who are both more attuned to opportunities in
the market, as well as more aware of the real estate under their
179
control.
Second, titling becomes a continuous process under this
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 311.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 311–12.
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rule, allowing villagers to decide whether to exercise their call option
based on real market opportunities, rather than on theoretical
180
predictions.
This flexibility in timing can even counteract the
negative effects of the government’s potential bad pricing that
villagers would be subject to where the government exercises its put
option. Instead, Rule 2 allows the villagers to exercise their options
anytime based on market opportunities, prices of real estate, and do
not have to rely on the price of exercising the call option at a certain
181
point in time.
While the government could also choose the timing
of exercising its put option, it is more difficult to choose the right time
without knowing the villagers’ information. Thus, Rule 2 leaves the
182
decision to the party with better information.
CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY-BASED ZONING OPTIONS
How should cities allocate legal entitlements efficiently? Ayres’
optional law theory tells us that “[l]iability rules delegate allocational
authority—allocational options—to privately informed disputants.
The delegation effect gives us strong reasons to believe that liability
rules do a better job than property rules in harnessing the private
183
Applying this theory to address illegal
information of disputants.”
housing in NYC, I argue that the government should grant illegal
housing owners options to buy legal titles rather than providing
blanket, direct legalization.
While the government knows its own needs and valuation of the
right to zone, individual owners have the information about their
illegal housing. The government has two roles in this case—one as a
disputant and potential entitlement holder, and the other as a
policymaker who can determine who has to decide the final allocation
of entitlements. The government as policymaker in this case has
complete information about one disputant—the government—but
does not have enough information about numerous illegal dwelling
units and their occupants’ valuations of them, which are more diverse
and speculative than the government’s valuations.
New York City can learn several things from Shenzhen. First,
decisions about illegal housing should be made at the community
level because externality is primarily a community-level issue, and
local communities are better at monitoring individual land uses than
the city government.
Second, neither legal enforcement nor
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 312.
Id.
Id.
AYRES, supra note 96, at 183.
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traditional legalization is going to effectively solve the problem of
illegal housing. Private land users have an informational advantage
and greater control over their land compared to the government,
which makes effective legal enforcement against prevalent zoning
violations almost impossible. “Traditional legalization” here can be
categorized into two rules—legalization without any charges on illegal
housing owners (i.e., Rule 3) and imposed legalization with charges
on illegal housing owners (i.e., Rule 6), which is the forced sale of the
legal title by the government to the adverse zoners. Application of
Rule 3 jeopardizes the integrity of zoning, ignores the negative
externality that adverse zoning imposes on the community and the
city, and encourages adverse zoning without effective checking on
private land use. Application of Rule 6 faces the challenges brought
by heterogeneity, such as making it impossible to set a price that
would work for all adverse zoners. The government should have the
initial entitlement to zoning generally but can create zoning options
for illegal housing owners. It would be financially burdensome for
the government to pay individual land users for zoning. Instead,
adverse zoning should only be applicable in limited cases and should
184
be auctioned at the community level.
Members who exercise these
options need to pay the community for the extra burden caused by
crowding, traffic, garbage collection, etc.
Essentially, the government should determine who decides, rather
than deciding the final allocation of resources. Options, instead of
titles, should be granted to individual adverse zoners, as individual
zoners are more numerous and capable of multiple takings than
collective decision-makers.
These zoners also have private
information and the more speculative valuation of the land, both of
which are less known to the government and the community.

184. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Governing Communities by
Auction, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2014).

